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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to explain how advanced economies with large mining sectors, like 
those of Australia and Chile, have managed to avoid the “resource curse.” Minerals (iron 
ore and coal) account for over two-thirds of Australia’s exports, and minerals (copper) 
amount to over two-thirds of Chilean exports as well. Hence, Australia and Chile have 
been labeled as commodity-based economies in the past. There is some validity to this 
claim, as Chile has gained significant fiscal revenues from copper sales, and Australia has 
experienced a mining boom over the past two decades, coupled with the rise of China. 
This work examines the relationship that natural resource mining and governance has to 
the political economy landscape of both countries. Using a historical institutionalist lens, 
various trends in the political economies of both nations are examined in relation to 
resource curse factors, such as developmental indicators, mining-specific policy and rents 
therefrom, and Dutch Disease.  
This thesis argues that the governments of both countries developed very different 
means to manage commodity market boom and bust cycles. Specifically, Chile has 
innovated counter-cyclical fiscal policies and copper funds, while Australia has pursued a 
more neutral fiscal policy with little intervention into mining by the commonwealth (until 
recently). The strengths and weaknesses apparent to both governments’ management of 
their mining sectors is explained and compared against resource curse factors. 
Forecasting is also presented to include possible ramifications from recent changes to the 
political economy of both countries in light of large downward swings in commodity 
prices and a slowdown in China.  
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 1 
I. THE RESOURCE CURSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What is the resource curse? Theorists of the resource curse draw causal 
relationships between explanatory variables such as natural resource wealth, regime and 
institutional strength, political economic structure, and international commodities markets 
to outcomes such as Dutch disease, inequality, economic development, and the tendency 
for destabilization and civil war. Detractors of the resource curse relationship see these 
same arguments not as causal, but as correlational—or interpret them differently, such as 
claiming that civil war creates demand for resources and therefore the resource curse is 
dependent on civil war and not the other way around.1  Most of the research pertaining to 
the resource curse has been on developing countries; I propose that a comparison of a 
developed (Australia) and near-developed country (Chile), both with large exposure to 
resource commodities (mining), can add insight into the resource curse. 
This thesis analyzes the independent variables of institutional quality, decision 
making around rents accrued, economic policy to mitigate resources, and state vs. private 
ownership; the possible intervening variables of market fluctuations and international 
crisis or change; and the relationship these factors have on the dependent variables of 
economic developmental factors, natural resource governance and policy, and evidence 
of Dutch disease. Any resource-dependent government should acknowledge that resource 
rents are not guaranteed, and thus employ contingency measures to exploit boom years to 
guard against a bust. The experiences of Chile and Australia offer insight into how 
resource-rich countries might be best placed to ensure their natural wealth becomes a 
blessing rather than a curse. The central argument of this thesis is that potential negative 
outcomes of the resource curse exist and impact all states. What is interesting is how even 
developed states may be affected by natural resource development. As we will see, 
Australia’s mining-related governance problems and Chile’s institutionalized copper 
                                                 
1 Rosser, Andrew, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, A Literature Review, Institute for 
Development Studies, April 2006, http://www2.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/pdfs/wp268.pdf. 
 2 
rental schemes offer insight as to how the extraction of natural resources may become a 
blessing or a curse. 
 Significance of the Research Question 1.
Much scholarly work into “the resource curse” has centered on developing 
nations with large deposits of oil. Michael Ross’s studies, for example, have shown that 
oil wealth often brings about negative consequences in the terms of inequality, civil war, 
instability, corruption, and underdevelopment.2  This thesis focuses not on oil; rather it 
investigates two resource-rich countries that appear to be “doing it right” and have 
developed strongly despite having some characteristics of a “resource curse” economy.  
The mining sectors of Chile and Australia are huge, and represent large parts of 
their exports and GDP. Chile and Australia are both major trading democracies in the 
Pacific theatre and have abundant natural resources. Both have similar population sizes, 
Australia at 22.5 million and Chile at 17.5 million, and are located in the Southern 
hemisphere.3 Australia’s GDP for 2012 was over 5.5 times higher than that of Chile, and 
per capita it was about 4.5 times higher.4  Since 2003, Australia’s GDP growth rate has 
been around 3 percent, while Chile’s annual growth rate has been closer to 6 percent.5  
Both nations have similar resource export sectors; Chilean copper amounts to more than 
50 percent of Chilean exports.6  Australia also has a mineral export sector that accounts 
for over 50 percent of their total exports—namely iron ore and coal.7  China is the largest 
buyer of both nations’ exports. 
                                                 
2 Ross, Michael, Lecture at NPS, 30 May 2014. 
3 The World Bank DataBank, Australia and Chile: “Population, Total,” accessed 10 April 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. 
4 The World Bank DataBank, Australia and Chile: “2013 GDP current US$, GDP Growth (Annual %), 
GDP Per Capita current US$, GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual %),” accessed 12 April 2015, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Observation of Economic Complexity, “Chile (CHL) Profile of Exports, Imports, and Trade 
Partners,” Accessed 1 March 2015, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/chl/. 
7 Observation of Economic Complexity,  “Australia (AUS) Profile of Exports, Imports, and Trade 
Partners,” Accessed 1 March 2015, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/aus/. 
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Australia and Chile share a degree of controversy over their mining sectors, to 
include Chilean decision making for allocating rents from copper mining and strong 
Australian mining sector growth possibly crowding out other sectors, such as the recent 
demise of the Australian automotive industry. An examination of the political economic 
structure and policy of each country is relevant to the study of the resource curse. 
Developed nations usually do not become associated with resource curse characteristics, 
as their economies are strong and diverse enough to avoid “the curse.”  My aim is to add 
to current scholarly material on the resource curse and show that while it is more 
prevalent in poor, developing countries, it still affects more developed states and 
industries. Further study into possible resource curse evidence in strong, secure 
economies will also bring about the benefit of evaluating counter arguments against the 
resource curse, such as casual vs. correlational explanations (as explained in Section 1). 
 
 Literature Review  2.
“[M]en of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and 
cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men temperate by 
necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious.”  
—Jean Bodin, Six Books of Commonwealth 
  
The literature on the resource curse attempts to explain why resource-rich 
developing countries tend to fare worse in their development than resource-poor 
countries. At the core of the problem is the way in which states fund extraction, obtain 
rents, and redistribute wealth from natural resources. The problem may be self-
reinforcing, as natural resources usually constitute significant revenues to developing 
states, and once resource rents become institutionalized the nature of these rents is very 
hard to change. Resource dependence may lead to a self-perpetuating cycle where the 
resource sector influences, and is in turn influenced by, political, social, economic, and 
institutional policy.8   
                                                 
8 Barma, Naazneen H., Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Tuan Minj Le, and Lorena Vineula, Rents to Riches? 
The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011, 1. 
 4 
The “resource curse” literature details the complex study of resource development 
issues and hypotheses concerning the causal mechanisms underpinning the resource curse 
come from numerous different theoretical approaches. Rosser’s Literature Survey of the 
Resource Curse identifies seven categories for study: Economistic, behavioralist, rational 
actor, state-centered, social capital, structuralist, and radical.9  This thesis focuses on the 
state-centered approach. For the purpose of this thesis, I outline below how the cognitive 
and societal approaches to the resource curse are integrated into the state-centered 
approach, and I develop the latter as the main theoretical lens orienting this thesis.  
Cognitive approaches to understanding the resource curse examine whether 
resource rents relate to or cause corruption amongst policy makers.10 In particular this 
approach examines whether there is a positive correlation between corrupt 
administrations and resource-dependent export sectors and how strong that connection 
appears to be. If evidence is found that suggests a strong connection between resource 
rents and corruption, such as evidence of bribes, favoritism, direct resource rent gains to 
administrators, then the resource rents can be labeled as prime causes of resource curse 
traits in said country. A problem with the cognitive approach, however, is defining and 
finding data for the testable variables. Without data, the cognitive approach can be overly 
generalized and fails to produce precise, quantifiable theory. 
Societal approaches examines if a resource boom damages state policy through 
benefiting nonstate actors by taking rents offshore or otherwise impeding growth.11  
Societal theory uses the independent variable of resource wealth to test the dependent 
variable of policy outcomes, in particular those that aid nonstate actors. A problem with 
societal approaches is that most suggest a causal relationship between slow growth and 
trade barriers, yet little actual correlation supports this theory: a study by Sachs and 
Warner found that slow growth and trade barriers only correlate one-third of the time.12  
                                                 
9 Rosser, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 13. 
10 Ross, Michael, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 309, 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/economics/pg/support/IDPM60072RossM%20(1
).pdf. 
11 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 310. 
12 Ibid., 311. 
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Societal claims also point to where nonstate actors have power over the developing 
state’s resources, which is most often not the case if the resources are state owned. 
Resource rents should give the state a nontax source of revenue that can be used to offset 
negative influences from nonstate actors. 
The state-centered approach that will be advanced in this thesis offers a hybrid of 
cognitive, societal, and institutional approaches to explain how resource rents can 
damage a state’s growth.13  A common state-centered theory is that of the rentier state, 
wherein states rely on resource rents and foreign aid for revenue instead of their 
population—which, in turn, reduces the states conceived notion of responsibility to its 
constituents and increases regime corruption and despotism.14  State-centered research 
examines if resource rents cause non-beneficial economic policy.15 Scholars such as 
Frieden and Page argue that the characteristics of a dominant export sector will influence 
a state’s economic policy.16   
The state-centered approach can be further divided into a sector-specific 
approach. Ross details how Shafer, in his book, Winners and Losers: How sectors shape 
the developmental prospects of states, claims that inflexible sectors cause weak 
institutions. Mineral sectors constitute “inflexible” exports since they comprise relatively 
few large firms, high entry/exit costs, and asset specificity.17  Inflexible sectors perform 
poorly when presented with commodity market shocks, which may requisite heavy state 
intervention. If an inflexible sector constitutes a big portion of exports and brings large 
resource rents, then the small number of firms can place high protectoral demands on the 
state, as the state would be compelled to keep the source of revenue. Some have argued 
that dominant export sectors tend to create their own sector-favored policy. These sectors 
can shape state policy to suit their means, at the expense of other sectors. Unfortunately, 
as Ross observes, Shafer’s dependent variable, “development outcomes,” is left 
                                                 
13 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 311.  
14 Ibid., 312. 
15 Ibid., 312. 
16 Ibid., 314. 
17 Ibid., 314.  
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somewhat vague. Developmental factors, or outcomes, could mean many things—a 
country’s GDP and GDP per capita are often cited, but development outcomes could also 
include measures of corruption, healthcare, inequality, and even sector “health” in terms 
of company debt, earnings, profit, etc. 
This thesis analyzes specific sector performance of Chilean and Australian mining 
in order to understand how the identified independent variables of the resource curse 
affect the outcome of corporate performance and sector health. For example, the thesis 
compares how well Chile’s public (CODELCO) and private mining companies compete, 
both domestically and internationally with the performance of the Australian mining 
sector. A great deal of sector performance can arguably be attributed to the structure of a 
state’s political economy, and the decisions that government make in developing their 
natural resource sector will directly affect the strength of corporations within that sector. 
Hence, sector health is an important measure for understanding a state’s ability to 
withstand the resource curse.  
Shafer also argues that dominant sectors can produce specific institutions, 
agencies, regulations, and tax havens designed to maximize resource rents from a relative 
few firms. Firms from non-leading sectors may become disadvantaged due to dominant 
sectors receiving favorable policy preference. On a larger scale, a dominant sector that 
draws favoritism may lead to policy that mistakes short-term gains over long term 
national interests. Ross points out that Shafer’s idea is sound, however he fails to 
properly define the variables that lead to the prescribed outcome.18 A more complete 
method can be found by constructing a variable based on what Barma, Kaiser, Le, and 
Vinuela describe as a “rent-capture regime:” The institutional model of ownership, 
contracts, and fiscal regimes under which decisions pertaining to natural resources 
exploration, extraction, and taxation.19  Therefore, this thesis utilizes the “rent-capture 
regime” concept as an independent variable and develops this variable for the Australian 
and Chilean cases.20 
                                                 
18 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 318. 
19 Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Vinuela, Rents to Riches?, 79. 
20 Ibid., 79. 
 7 
Another key element in a comparison of state political economy and resource 
sectors is the degree and character of state-owned vs. private-owned natural resource 
industry. Ross brings up three negative traits of state ownership: 1) Shocks in commodity 
markets that were buffered through multinational corporations (MNC’s) are now felt 
directly 2) state-ownership of industry and rents collected tends to lead to a false sense of 
budget security, leading towards lapses in fiscal judgment and over-spending, and 3) 
government-run “parastatals” tend to be highly inefficient due to lack of competition.21  
What drives a state to nationalize vs. privatize its natural resources?  Luong and Weinthal 
hypothesize that state leaders who have high access to natural resources and enjoy a 
consolidated regime base will choose to nationalize their energy sector, whereas leaders 
with low access to natural resources and a contested regime base will choose to privatize 
their energy sector.22  The model they built accurately explained the energy development 
choices of several states. I will build on their study of how states initially chose to 
develop their natural resources by focusing on how mineral development strategies 
change over time, and what influences these changes. 
B. THE CASES 
 Chile 1.
If state-ownership of the natural resource industry tends to create negative effects, 
what explains the perseverance of Chile’s state-owned CODELCO copper mining 
corporation, and the seemingly beneficial gains it has brought to Chile’s economy?  
Investigating a state’s resource rents and how they are used will shed light on this topic.23  
Specifically, this thesis will investigate how Chile’s political economy capitalizes on the 
rents from CODELCO to provide or detract from social goods for Chileans.  
Since the formation of CODELCO following the nationalization of copper in 
Chile, the Chilean economy has received significant rents from copper exports. In 2007, 
                                                 
21 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 320. 
22 Luong, Pauline Jones, and Erika Weinthal, “Prelude to the resource curse explaining oil and gas 
development strategies in the Soviet successor states and beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 4 
(2001): 367. 
23 Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Vinuela, Rents to Riches?, 165. 
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some 30 years after nationalization, CODELCO still accounted for 1/3 of total copper 
output and 16percent of total fiscal revenue.24  Chile is widely recognized as a success 
story in the fight against a resource curse. Study into Chile’s success reveals a deliberate 
struggle against resource curse characteristics and the insight that “fiscal discipline and 
quality of institutions do matter when facing commodity price windfalls.”25 . 
Even those that think the resource curse is a myth find a connection between 
natural resources and development; they simply reverse the equation—instead of over-
development of natural resource sectors having adverse effect on development, under-
development of natural resource sectors causes adverse effects. As Wright and Czelusta 
argue in “Myth of the Resource Curse,” Chile’s initial slow development of its copper 
sector caused it to lag behind that of the US, even though Chile enjoyed higher 
endowments of copper.26  It was not until protectionism eroded and technology improved 
in Chile that copper exports improved. 
 Australia 2.
Australia presents another case study of early policy inhibiting the development 
of natural resources, thus hindering economic growth. For many reasons, Australia 
underdeveloped its mineral sector—mostly due to the small population failing to asses 
and access its resources combined with protectionist and insular policies. Wright and 
Czelusta found that once Australia lifted the protectionist resource policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the mineral sector growth took off and so did GDP.27  Ironically, what they 
claim detracts from the resource curse actually adds another avenue to research—namely, 
the policies states have followed that affected resource development. If the use or 
underuse of resources affects growth, then one could argue that the resource curse 
applies. This is another aspect of the resource curse due to protectionist policy causing 
                                                 
24 Fuentes, J. Rodrigo, “Managing Natural Resources Revenue, The Case of Chile” (OxCarre 
Research Paper 40, Oxford University), 2, http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images/stories/papers/ 
RevenueWatch/oxcarrerp201040.pdf. 
25 Fuentes, “Managing Natural Resources Revenue, Chile,” 3. 
26 Wright, Gavin, and Jesse Czelusta, “Why economies slow: the myth of the resource curse.” 
Challenge 47, no. 2 (2004): 14, http://web.stanford.edu/~write/papers/Wright%20Res%20Curse.pdf. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
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underdevelopment of resource sectors, and in turn missed access to rents, which impeded 
growth. What is implied here is that protectionist policy impedes growth, or that growth 
in the resource sector corresponds with growth in the overall economy. This thesis further 
examines these cases to see what correlation exists. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The goal of this thesis is to study how states make political economy decisions 
about resource rents based on external and internal factors. The aim is not to prove the 
existence of a resource curse; rather it is to examine the quality of institutions in regards 
to the mining sectors of Chile and Australia in order to understand the extent to which 
they have successfully avoided certain elements of the resource curse and yet still fall 
prey to others, such as Dutch Disease.  
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the explanatory factors of resource 
wealth and rents, regime and institutional strength, and exposure to market shocks carry a 
causal relationship to outcomes of economic development, inequality, and Dutch disease. 
In turn, the particular way in which states implement economic and natural resource 
management policies directly shape their vulnerability to the resource curse or, 
conversely, their ability to reap benefits from their resource sectors. The basic argument 
is as follows: a state’s “rent capture regime” affects its ability to manage its natural 
resource wealth for strong sector health/performance and good development outcomes, in 
the face of exogenous shocks such as commodity price fluctuation. This hypothesis 
consists of two parts: 1) states that rely on their natural resources for the dominant 
portion of their exports will be more prone to resource curse factors, and 2) secondarily, 
states will adapt their mineral development strategies in accordance with domestic 
influences; specifically, governments will pursue nationalization or privatization of 
resources based on what they perceive will consolidate their regime’s base of power. Of 
course, a key variable will be the type of government in place. Perhaps consolidated 
democracies, such as Australia, will be not as prone to a regime taking utilitarian steps in 
controlling the mineral sector than an arguably more volatile democracy like Chile. Chile 
underwent a socialist revolution that resulted in military dictatorship and great economic 
 10 
policy change, which will be a key factor in studying the development of Chile vs. 
Australia’s mineral sector and economy. 
Both Chile and Australia display inflexible mining sectors. Relatively few firms 
control most natural resources and the state has built specific institutions to govern these 
industries. Australia promotes a privatized mining sector, whereas Chile has a large 
nationalized mining company—this is a major difference between the two countries and 
as the body of this thesis explains is a key explanatory variable for each country’s 
resource curse equation. Neoliberalism argues that planned economy and nationalized 
industry is inherently inefficient versus privatization and a market-liberal economic 
approach. This thesis somewhat refutes that claim, through the case of Chile. Mining 
sector-specific policy and taxation also carry an indirect impact on the overall economy if 
they give incentives to the mining sector over other sectors. The mining sector will have a 
beneficial political and economic effect if rents are used toward public goods, do not 
squeeze out other sectors, adversely affect exchange rates, or fall prey to corruption and 
waste. Chile manages its copper industry and national interests through its rent-capture 
regime—the institution of copper ownership, contracts, and fiscal regimes under which 
decisions pertaining to copper exploration, extraction, and taxation.28   
 Resource Curse Factors: Economic Development, Weak Institutions, 1.
Rent Seeking, and Dutch Disease 
The resource curse dependent variables listed above are examined for both Chile 
and Australia. Economic development is viewed in terms of GDP growth over time and 
mining contributions to GDP over time. The governmental institutions and rent capture 
regimes are examined via the state-centered institutionalist approach and specific 
frameworks, such as the World Bank’s natural resource value chain framework. The body 
of this thesis also explores cases of rent-seeking and corrupt behavior surrounding 
mining, plus the economic effects of this behavior. Another dependent variable to explore 
is Dutch disease, which is further explained below.  
                                                 
28 Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Vinuela, Rents to Riches?, 79. 
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What economists usually coin Dutch Disease occurs when a commodity boom 
sends one (or related) sectors skyrocketing, but crowds out other sectors through high 
wages in the dominant sector and a rising real exchange rate. While the booming sector 
does reap record revenues, there are some negatives: other tradable goods are hurt as they 
become more expensive on the global scale, and other domestic sectors lose out to the 
dominant sector in terms of salaries and capital flow.29  The result may be increasing 
fiscal deficits and ever-greater reliance on the hot commodity for revenues. It is called 
Dutch disease because the Netherlands underwent a de-industrialization period following 
the discovery and development of natural gas fields in 1959.30 The same appears to be 
occurring in Australia. 
Some Australians claim, for example, that “the mining sector has crowded out 
almost all other sectors of the economy and also funneled credit and liquidity into a 
housing bubble in the real estate sector.”31  This thesis will examine the effects of Dutch 
Disease on the Australian and Chilean economies by looking for evidence of crowding 
out of other sectors and the impact of exchange rate appreciation due to commodity 
booms. 
 Research Design 2.
This thesis is based upon a case-comparative analysis of the Chilean and 
Australian mining sectors, how the two governments conduct economic and natural 
resource management policy, and the effect of natural resources on the overall political 
economy of each country. The overall goal is to understand, through this comparative 
analysis, how resource-rich countries might be best placed to ensure their natural wealth 
becomes a blessing rather than a curse.  
                                                 
29 Planchette, Paulette, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources, World Trade 
Organization, 91, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report10_e.pdf. 
30 “The Dutch Disease,” The Economist, November 26, 1977, 83. 
31 Martin, Peter, “Warning: After Boom it’ll be Dutch and go,” Sydney Morning Herald Business Day, 




In turn, this project examines inter-related questions such as: What comparative 
advantage does one mining sector have over the other? What effect does the mining 
sector in each country have on their overall economy? What political economic strategy 
and structure does each nation take towards their mining sector?  
This thesis explores how the rent capture regimes in Chile and Australia have 
affected the ability of these two countries to manage their natural resource wealth over 
the past four decades since the 1973 oil crisis. For resource base I use World Trade 
Organization data, such as the World Trade Reports on Resources. In order to capture the 
rent capture regime in each country, my primary sources are the Australian and Chilean 
governments pertaining to their resource management policies. I measure developmental 
outcomes based on the availability and cost estimates for public goods provided from 
resource rents and taxes as a percentage of GDP. GDP data is sourced from The World 
Bank. Commodity prices are sourced from the World Trade Organization.  
For evidence of Dutch disease I test mineral profits and wages vs. that of other 
sectors and the impact upon currency exchange rates of each state. Inequality and 
development figures come from the World Bank’s GINI coefficient data, GDP, GDP 
growth rate, and GDP per capita. Destabilization and conflict are studied via historical 
third party data. Sector health compares Leading Corporation’s balance sheet in each 
state’s mineral sector and evaluates them in terms of corporate debt, revenue, profit, 
outlook, capital, size, and tax structure.  
 Thesis Overview 3.
This thesis asks if resource dependence is necessarily negative, and points out 
characteristics of two resource-rich economies that perform well despite having some 
resource dependency. After introducing this question, a review of scholarly material for 
and against the resource curse is conducted with the aim to show that institutions matter. 
Following the literature review and arguments supporting that resource curse 
characteristics depend on institutions, there will be a chapter each dedicated to the 
comparative case studies of Chile and Australia’s mining sectors. The thesis concludes 
 13 
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II. CHILE CASE STUDY 
A. CHILE AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Given that Chile depends on copper sales for part of its fiscal revenue, and that 
resource rents in Chile have been high, one would expect Chile to have a safety blanket 
against recession. Yet, Chile’s economy experienced severe recessions in 1975 and 1982, 
followed by less severe recessions in 1999 and 2009.32 Figure 1 illustrates a core 
question orienting this chapter: how are recession and mineral rents related?  
 
Figure 1.  Chile Mineral Rents vs. GDP Growth 1970–201333 
Of all Latin American countries, Chile is among the most economically developed 
and has a reputation for government institutional strength compared to that of her 
neighbors. Chileans’ enjoy the highest GDP per Capita ($USD 21,911 in 2013 per World 
Bank Development Indicators) in the region, have the highest rated sovereign bond in 
                                                 
32 The World Bank, World Development Indicators, mineral rents (%GDP) and GDP Growth (Annual 
%), Chile 1969–2013, accessed 1 May 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi. 
33 The Worldbank Databank, “Mineral rents (% of GDP), GDP growth (Annual %) Chile, 1969–
2014,” accessed 1 May 2015. 
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South America, have joined the OECD, and are a regional and international powerhouse 
in terms of trade, having signed 22 trade agreements with 60 countries.34  Chile is also 
the world’s largest exporter of copper. Over half of Chile’s exports come from copper 
mining or are related to it.35  A significant portion of this export wealth is taxed or 
collected as royalties and forms a large fiscal windfall for the state. In the last decade, at 
least 18 percent of Chile’s fiscal revenue came from mining, and fiscal revenues gained 
were over 25 percent during the years 2005–2010, when commodity prices were 
highest.36  Does the significant portion of copper exports expose Chile to unfavorable 
economic outcomes? What happens if the price of copper declines rapidly?  How does 
Chile guard against the resource curse?  
This chapter explores Chile’s mining sector and the intervening effects that 
Chile’s political economic institutions have on economic outcomes related to the mining 
sector. The findings support that Chile has developed multiple tools to guard against 
resource curse factors, such as copper funds and counter-cyclical fiscal policy. However, 
Chile faces several social challenges as its population demands more public spending 
from copper revenues. If hasty and near-sighted copper-revenue-related reforms take 
place, then resource curse factors are likely to rise. Section B contains a brief review of 
the resource curse, and centers on the method and framework for this chapter. Section C 
explores Chile’s political economic history from copper nationalization to privatization 
and examines case studies of multiple boom/bust cycles that led to the creation of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy and the copper funds in Chile. Section D delivers forecasts 
and concluding remarks. 
                                                 
34 The CIA World Factbook: Chile, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ci.html. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Orihuela, José Carlos, How Do “Mineral-States” Learn? Path-Dependence, Networks, and Policy 
Change in the Development of Economic Institutions. 2013, World Development 43: 144. 
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B. APPROACH AND FRAMEWORK 
 State-Oriented Institutional Approach 1.
The first chapter of this thesis posits that the methods in which states explores for, 
develop, extract, govern, and distribute rents from natural resources determines their 
susceptibility to resource curse factors. Now we will turn the state-centered (historical 
and societal) lens to the institutions of Chile to discern how Chile manages natural 
resources and the resource curse. As explained, the state-centered approach is a hybrid of 
historical and societal institutionalism that can help explain how resource rents may 
actually damage a state’s growth.37  Historical institutionalism focuses on trends of 
consistent behavior over time, or “punctuated equilibrium,” until a critical juncture 
occurs enabling a fundamental shift away from old norms and establishes new ones.38  
Societal approaches of the resource curse examine if a resource boom damages state 
policy through benefiting nonstate actors by taking rents offshore or otherwise impeding 
growth.39  The state-centered hybrid approach, then, uses societal changes over time to 
evaluate institutions and explain change. 
This state-centered institutionalism approach is used to examine Chile’s rentier 
state—or lack thereof. We will examine if Chile’s cooper revenues appear to influence 
the state to act not out of care for its taxpaying citizens, but instead for interests to control 
the mining rentier mechanism. Adopting a state-centered approach is apt for Chile as the 
state is relatively strong and centralized for Latin American standards, and the dominant 
export sector (copper) plays a big part in the state’s finances. Scholars such as Frieden 
and Page noted that the characteristics of a dominant export sector will influence a state’s 
economic policy; this may seem intuitive but it is not that simple.40 Elements of causal 
resource curse outcomes also apply to the equation of Chile’s institutional response to 
mining. Namely, the fact that copper is the dominant export does not fully explain why 
                                                 
37 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse., 311.  
38 Orihuela, How do Mineral States Learn?, 140. 
39 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 310. 
40 Ibid., 313. 
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Chile developed copper funds and counter-cyclical fiscal policy: analysis of the path to 
these institutional developments is in section C. 
Dividing the state-centered approach into a sector-specific state-centered 
approach gives further insight into government decision making frameworks that shape 
Chile’s copper sector, and how Chile’s copper sector in turn shapes government. Some 
argue that inflexible sectors, such as mining, cause weak institutions.41  Mineral sectors 
constitute inflexible exports since they comprise relatively few large firms, high entry/
exit costs, and asset specificity.42 In evaluating this claim I found more causal linkage to 
poor economic performance resonating from poor governance than from problems within 
the mining sector itself. Specifically, the manner of how rents are used in government 
revenue streams has been of particular importance to Chile. My specific framework for 
the body of the thesis is explained below. 
 Value-Chain Framework  2.
This chapter on Chile draws from the World Bank’s Natural Resource 
Management Value Chain Framework to evaluate the susceptibility of Chile’s economy 
to resource curse pitfalls from copper sales.43  The value chain framework has four parts, 
and begins with examining how contracts are awarded and how the copper sector is 
organized. Next is the evaluation of copper regulations and monitoring of operations. 
Examined next is the complex collection and distribution of taxes and royalties from 
copper mining. Finally, assessed is how the government uses the revenues from copper 
rents, both in management and distribution. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF TOOLS AGAINST THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 Politicization of Copper Nationalization  1.
The politicization of mineral sectors within Latin America has been at the center 
of contemporary political economy, and represents “arguably the most profound regional 
                                                 
41 Ross, Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 314. 
42 Ibid., 314.  
43 Barma, Petroleum, Governance, and Fragility, 337. 
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policy shifts of the past decade.”44  Much of Latin America experienced a post-
neoliberalism movement that emphasized re-nationalization of natural resources, in order 
to provide funding for increased social welfare programs, move away from multi-
national-corporation big business, and lessen dependency on international finance 
institutions.45  Countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and even Brazil 
embarked on this post-neoliberal, socialistic path. However, not all Latin American states 
followed suit. In the late 1980s, Chile actually increased its resource privatization path, a 
step in the opposite direction from most of Latin America. Why did Chile’s government 
choose not to follow their neighbors and embrace post-neoliberalism?  Post-Pinochet 
Chile represents a good case trial for examining the interactions between political 
economic institutions, state capacity, and natural resources as they relate to economic 
outcomes. A path dependent argument sheds light into why the Chilean copper industry 
was nationalized, and then moved back towards, but never completely, privatized. 
State ownership of the Chilean mining sector began in the early 1970s after the 
nationalization of copper and the creation of CODELCO (Chile’s state owned copper 
industry conglomerate).46 The government of Frei Montalva reformed land ownership 
and nationalized Chile’s copper industry in 1970 in an attempt to curb inflation and 
address social issues. Strong interests in Chile and the West opposed this move, and steps 
were taken to dispose of Frei’s successor, Salvador Allende and the socialists in Chile. 
The subsequent military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ushered in a decidedly 
capitalist agenda of neoliberal development following the so-called “Washington 
Consensus.”   
The Washington Consensus categorically pursued free-markets and set the 
foundation for neoliberal economics in Chile. Institutions were built around laissez-faire, 
liberal-market economics, which is still prevalent today. Pinochet recruited several 
Chilean students from the University of Chicago (The “Chicago Boys”) who were Milton 
                                                 
44 Hogenboom, Barbara. “Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals in Latin America.” Journal of 
Developing Societies 28, no. 2 (2012): 134.  
45 Ibid., 148–9. 
46 Ibid., 136. 
 20 
Friedman disciples to implement the necessary changes. Socialist import-subsidized 
industrialization and structuralist policy was removed and trade barriers were torn down. 
Social security and the majority of state-led firms were privatized, and a central bank was 
created to control interest and exchange rates.47 Pinochet aggressively pursued the 
neoliberal agenda, yet decided not to reverse the Allende-era nationalization of the 
mining industry.  
Pinochet’s decision not to privatize the mines may appear anti-neoliberal, but it is 
in line with what scholars would expect given the circumstances. Luong and Weinthal’s 
Prelude to the Resource Curse hypothesizes that state leaders who have high access to 
natural resources and enjoy a consolidated regime base will choose to nationalize their 
energy sector, whereas leaders with low access to natural resources and a contested 
regime base will choose to privatize their energy sector.48  Pinochet was the only show in 
town and he had easy access to the mining sector; it was already nationalized. Thus, it’s 
not surprising he did not pursue re-privatization for the mines. Luong and Weinthal’s 
model accurately explained the energy development choices of several states, and also 
explains why Pinochet did not privatize the mining sector: in so doing he consolidated a 
source of strategic power for himself and the military government. It was the military 
government that unified the nationalized copper sector into the CODELCO corporation, 
and also legislated the so-called “copper law” that guaranteed 10 percent of all 
CODELCO export revenue went to the Armed Forces.49  Such a consolidated grip on a 
dominant export base makes experiencing the resource curse more likely. Examining 
Chile’s copper institutions and political economy using a value-chain framework allows 
further analysis into resource curse factors. 
                                                 
47 Muñoz, Heraldo, “Is Agusto Pinochet Responsible for Chile’s success?” Washington Post, 
September 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heraldo-mun-oz-is-augusto-pinochet-
responsible-for-chiles-success/2013/09/12/5d53ded8-1737-11e3-be6e-dc6ae8a5b3a8_story.html, accessed 
June 11, 2014. 
48 Luong and Weinthal, Prelude to the Resource Curse, 367. 
49 Matei and Robledo, Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness—Chile, 284. 
 21 
 Economic History and Evolution of Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy 2.
Neoliberalism was supposed to kick start growth, but unfortunately the military 
dictatorship’s neoliberal model was plagued with crony-based political networks of 
patronage and political maneuvering between business elites and policy makers.50  This 
system perpetuated an elitist self-reinforcing institutional malady, which was prone to 
resource curse factors of resource mismanagement, as became evident in the coming debt 
crisis. 
By 1980, neoliberalism’s extreme deregulation had in effect removed any 
protection against market fluctuations and indebted the state. The laissez-faire experiment 
ended with a huge slide, as Chile’s economy fell by almost 15percent.51 Commonly 
known as the Latin American debt crisis, the 1982 recession kicked off a severe decline, 
and Chile suffered a 10.3 percent drop in GDP growth that year alone.52 The crisis 
enabled a set of actions that historical institutionalists would call a critical juncture in the 
management of Chile’s political economy and resource rent capture regime.53   
The reforms that came about from the debt crisis affected both the political 
economy of the state and mining sector institutions and governance. Changes to the value 
chain were significant. Not only did the resource sector become reorganized through a 
modernization program of CODELCO in order to attract foreign direct investment, but 
the regulations on taxation and revenue distribution were changed as well.54  The IMF 
and World Bank worked with Chile to develop the 1986 Copper Rent Compensation 
Fund (CRCF), which enabled Chile to save around two percent of GDP for fiscal 
emergencies.55 The result of CRCF was a fundamental shift in the way Chile managed 
                                                 
50 Cypher, James M, “The Political Economy of the Chilean State in the Neoliberal Era: 1973–2005.” 
Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 26, no. 4 (2005): 
767. 
51French-Davis, Ricardo,  Economic reforms in Chile: From dictatorship to democracy, University of 
Michigan Press, 2002, 13. 
52 Orihuela, How do Mineral States Learn? 143. 
53 Ibid., 143. 
54 Fuentes, Managing Natural Resources Revenue: The Case of Chile, 19. 
55 Orihuela, How do Mineral States Learn?, 144. 
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copper revenues, and enabled fiscal responsibility by putting limits on boom spending by 
changing copper revenues from state spending accounts into state savings accounts. One 
could argue that the debt crisis contributed to the removal of the military dictatorship, as 
Pinochet lost the plebiscite not long after. However, his neoliberal economic legacy 
would remain. 
The post-Pinochet Concertación government regimes attempted to reform the 
Chilean economy where possible. Their eventual efforts fixed the Chilean economic 
system by providing safety nets against external shocks, expanded free trade agreements, 
lowered tariffs, gained access to bigger markets for Chilean exports, fueled export-led 
development, and established systems to attract more foreign investment.56 However, it 
would take a few more resource curse-linked recessions to motivate the state to change 
fiscal policy. 
One example comes from when Chile experienced recession again during the 
Asia/Russia crisis of 1998.57  The fallout in copper prices from Asia’s drop-off in 
demand was exacerbated by Russia’s currency crisis. Chile’s continued exposure to 
market shocks is evident that resource curse factors of boom/bust fiscal mismanagement 
had persisted, even with CRCF in effect. Chile’s central bank responded to the crisis by 
raising interest rates and selling close to 3BN US$ in reserves on the foreign exchange 
market in order to keep the currency stable.58  These actions were taken to stymie capital 
fleeing the country, as had occurred in the Latin American debt crisis. Nonetheless, 
businesses, banks, and even some of the public sector did move their assets to safer 
currencies (although much less capital flight occurred than in 1982), displaying that Chile 
still needed a solution to boom/bust cycles in commodity markets. 
That solution came in the form of new countercyclical fiscal policy to guard 
against downturns by further restricting the fiscal spending ability of the government in 
good times and reshaping the copper management institutions again. In 2000, President 
                                                 
56 Meyer, Chile CRS Report, 9. 
57 Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns, Fear of Sudden Stops: Lessons from Australia and Chile, 3. 
58 Ibid., 4. 
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Lagos and finance minister Eyzaguirre were instrumental in voluntarily adopting 
countercyclical fiscal policy that limited spending on new programs to one percent of 
potential GDP.59 Chile’s countercyclical fiscal rule  uses extensive forecasting to account 
for what future copper prices might bring in terms of future state revenues, by forecasting 
potential and medium-term copper prices to estimate future fiscal balances.60 The copper 
funds of 2006 were enacted as part of the Fiscal Responsibilities Law to further restrict 
fiscal spending after it became apparent that copper prices were on the rise.61   Chile’s 
current copper funds grew out of a 2006 reform bill that created the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law. The goal was to ensure no future government let into temptation and over-spent 
copper revenues in a booming market. This law took the old Copper Stabilization Fund 
(CSF) and replaced it with a broader sovereign-wealth-specific Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund (ESSF) and created a new Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) plus 
reinforced the structural balance counter-cyclical fiscal rule with more robust legal 
framework and set explicit formal mechanism for financing the central bank.62  Modeled 
after similar Norwegian funds, Chile’s copper funds made legally binding a one percent 
structural surplus and were instrumental in keeping Chile’s economy relatively unscathed 
during the global financial crisis of 2008.63  These fiscal regulations and copper funds 
have been advanced as a cornerstone of Chile’s new reputation for robust governmental 
and financial institutions.  
What results have the copper funds brought Chile?  From a revenue management 
perspective, the funds have been instrumental in keeping Chile out of recession. Although 
Chile did experience negative one percent growth in 2008 due to the global financial 
crisis (Table 1), it was able to tap into the copper funds for emergency spending that 
negated a larger crisis. This fund was also drawn from to support rebuilding efforts in the 
                                                 
59 Orihuela, How do Mineral States Learn? 143. 
60 Ibid., 143. 
61 Ibid., 144. 
62 Korinek, Jane, Mineral resource policies for growth and development: good practice examples, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tad/events/Chapter%207_Final.pdf, 14. 
63 Ibid., 144.  
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wake of a large earthquake in 2010.64 The rainy day fund remains an important fiscal tool 
Chile has to stave off the resource curse. 
Chile’s fiscal management has also become much more robust because of the 
funds, and both transparency and stability have increased over time. Important reforms to 
the taxation and revenue management powers of the government helped to stabilize the 
Chilean economy against the boom/bust cycles of the past. 
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FORECASTS 
This chapter employed a state-sector institutional approach combined with a value 
chain framework to analyze the evolution of Chile’s resource rent institution in order to 
explore causal factors of the resource curse. Chile represents a good case study for what 
specific policy developing nations can build into their fiscal and resource rent institutions 
in order to minimize negative resource curse factors. 
If, as this chapter explains, Chile has come a long way in consolidating its copper 
rentier state institutions; what challenges remain? One must remember that Chile’s re-
democratization was relatively recent, and there are still problems associated with the old 
regime. The 2011 student protests in Chile illuminated grievances dating back to the 
military dictatorship. Initially, the protests were against the rising cost of private 
education in Chile. However, they soon blossomed into a sizeable social movement for 
change on many levels. Quiet, progressive Chile was racked with protests not seen since 
the dictatorship days. In June and July of 2011 a somewhat shocked world watched as 
hundreds of thousands of Chilean students and citizens mobilized and marched through 
the streets.65  The social movement in Chile expanded as the students and others found 
more fuel for their cause in underlying problems with the state. The Chilean Winter 
movement expanded from education reform to include larger state-centric problems with 
inequality (Chile’s GINI coefficient, at .51, is the worst in the OECD, according to the 
World Bank Databank) and perceived problems with Chile’s neoliberal structural roots. 
                                                 
64 Meyer, Chile CRS report, 10.  
65 Scorpio, “What Caused the Chilean Winter?,”  2.  
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Further research into the structural legacy from Pinochet’s regime could unfold specific 
problems that contribute to Chile’s socioeconomic problems. 
A further paradigm in the socioeconomic mix is the future of military spending. 
At the creation of CODELCO the military dictatorship enacted legislation so that, by law, 
10 percent of all state-owned CODELCO gross revenue would go to the armed forces.66 
The so-called “copper law” guaranteed a high military budget through an opaque rent-
gathering mechanism. This allocation mechanism is not subject to parliamentary 
oversight nor is it subject to transparency laws that apply to the public sector.67  The 
copper law, then, represents a resource curse factor of rent seeking that the military 
dictatorship utilized to control and perpetuate rents from the copper sector. Some argue 
that the reason the copper law has perpetuated for so long is CODELCO itself:  “The 
explanation for [CODELCO’s] survival under neoliberalism is that 10 percent of its sales 
go directly to the coffers of the military under the Ley Reservada del Cobra.”68 This 
claim does fall in line with resource curse theory in that rent-seeking institutions tend to 
perpetuate themselves. Both the military and CODELCO could feed off each other as 
CODELCO would gain a powerful ally in state affairs (at least initially) and the military 
would gain funding without oversight.  
From a developmental point of view, the copper law needs to be changed because 
it hurts the state by damaging institutions through promoting cronyism, rent-seeking 
behavior, and corrupt practices. Or, as one article says, “Until the [copper] fund is fully 
under parliamentary oversight, opposition critics say, Chile cannot call itself a true 
democracy.”69 The current administration has attempted to scrap the copper law, and the 
                                                 
66 Matei and Robledo, Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness—Chile, 284. 
67 Solimano, Andrés, Chile and the neoliberal trap: the post-Pinochet era, Cambridge University 
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lower house voted unanimously to do just that on June 16th, 2012.70  As of yet, it is 
unclear where the legislative process is in rescinding this law. 
As far as the resource curse is concerned, Chile’s past presents a good example 
for developing states to study in order to avoid resource curse pitfalls, particularly fiscal 
policy tools to guard against market shocks. Yet each state must take into account their 
own culture and context; there is no one size fits all solution to growth and other 
socioeconomic problems. For Chile, the evolution of state institutions around copper 
rents has created a mechanism that enabled stability by having funds made available for a 
rainy day. However, as the recent protests demonstrate there are public pressures upon 
the Chilean government to increase spending from the copper funds in order to improve 
education, lower inequality, and increase social goods. From a resource curse 
perspective, the pressure to spend today may result in problems tomorrow. 
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III. AUSTRALIA CASE STUDY 
A. AUSTRALIA AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Australia does not jump out as an obviously resource-dependent country. It is a 
developed country that has followed an evolution away from mineral dependence and 
mining currently adds only 7 percent to GDP.71  Mining does play an interesting role in 
Australia’s contemporary political economy, however, because rents from the mining 
sector increased 700 percent in the past decade. Figure 2 illustrates this trend by mapping 
the share of mining rents in GDP since 1971. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Australia Mineral Rents as a Percent of GDP 1971–201372 
This chapter examines the Australian economy for evidence of causal resource 
curse factors leading to undesirable economic outcomes. Australia’s economic exposure 
to the resource curse is examined by analyzing key developmental factors of institutional 
quality and its resource rent capture scheme together with intervening variables of market 
fluctuations and exchange rates to help explain dependent variables of economic 
development and Dutch disease. There are three parts to this chapter: 1) Developmental 
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factors of institutional quality, economic management, and resource rents; 2) Australian 
Reserve Bank monetary policy in regards to market shocks and responses through 
exchange rates and currency derivatives; and 3) Resource curse factors of Dutch disease 
and implications for the Australian economy from the current mining boom. 
The mining sector in Australia is significantly large in terms of foreign and 
domestic investment, wages, output, and share of exports. Australia presents a good case 
for examining a developed country with a large mining sector that dominates exports. 
The goal of this chapter is to present historical, societal, and current examples about how 
countries can develop their resource sectors in order to avoid negative cyclical factors 
from commodity market swings, and give insight into how even developed countries 
must take heed of resource curse factors that can affect their overall economy. Many 
scholarly works have produced evidence that countries dependent on limited resources 
versus those that have diversified will be worse off economically in the long term.73  If 
not carefully managed, Australia could suffer negative consequences from the current 
mining boom—particularly now as the mining industry shifts from investment to full-
scale production.  
Australia has the world’s largest economic resources of brown coal, mineral 
sands, nickel, silver, uranium, zinc and lead. It is the second-highest holder of bauxite, 
copper, gold, iron ore, niobium, tantalum, and manganese ore.74 Australia has made good 
use of its resource base; the mineral sector accounts for over 50 percent of total exports—
namely iron ore and coal.75  The recent mining boom has caused much controversy 
within Australia, and this thesis explores large facets of the Australian economy to see 
how the mining boom affects the current structure of the Australian economy.  
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B. AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS AND THE RESOURCE 
CURSE 
 Institutional Quality 1.
 
Of interest are the political agenda and policy decisions that impacted the 
economy; hence this section explores the history of Australia’s governmental mining 
policy. In particular, the structure and output of institutions matter. By institutions I mean 
the mining sector and its health/competitiveness vs. other international mining sectors; 
the government and its policy towards the mining sector; transparency in terms of 
resource rents; and fiscal policy combined with the preferences of leaders. Also examined 
is mining sector’s effects upon exchange rates, non-mining sectors, and the overall 
economy. The quality of institutions depends on the scope and point of view. For 
understanding the evolution of the Australian mining institution, one must take into 
account both sociological and historical institutionalism. The new institutionalism is an 
apt framework from which to build such a perspective. 
Historical institutionalism focuses on trends of consistent behavior over time, or 
“punctuated equilibrium,” until a critical juncture occurs that enables a fundamental shift 
away from old ways and establishes new norms.76  Sociological institutionalism takes a 
more nuanced approach, and attempts to explain institutional preference through 
contextual societal changes that affect the evolution of the state. As opposed to rational 
choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism explains that certain social structures 
may create norms through diffusion, imitation, or coercion rather than by rational choices 
of political elites.77 
Another factor to consider for institutional character is path dependence. The 
manner in which the state, financial, and mining institution was founded and evolved 
matters significantly. Path dependence can help to explain certain trends and strengths, 
such as Australia’s relative economic “head start” due to the fact that its economy and 
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government were modeled on those of the UK. Early Australia not only benefited from a 
very robust trade partner in the UK, but also was able to adopt their stable bi-cameral 
parliamentary system with an independent judiciary and hence build a strong state. This 
framework and strong governance policy enabled Australia to develop sound legal, 
banking, financial, and labor sectors required for sustained growth.78  The country also 
enjoyed easy access to London’s capital markets that allowed for favorable borrowing at 
low interest and long maturities.79  Australia’s early history as a commodity powerhouse 
is similar to Argentina’s—prior to the 1890s recession Australian GDP per capita was 
around 40 percent higher than that of the US.80  However, multiple shocks in commodity 
markets plagued Australia’s economy in the twentieth century, and it took a long time to 
learn from these booms and busts.  
The final factor explaining institutional quality is choice. Historical and 
sociological context and path dependence only situate a possible policy agenda; they do 
not outright determine choice. Institutional choice here is explained through the 
preference of political elites, their agenda, and their analysis of economic issues. The 
recent political turmoil in Australia is a good example of political elites’ choices that 
affected overall governance negatively. Australia’s once optimistic outlook has been 
overshadowed by poor leadership choices from the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Policy 
errors by the ALP created many governance problems within Australia, chiefly those 
related to mining governance and taxation. Two attempted and failed mineral taxation 
schemes lay at the center of Australia’s recent governance problem—the Resource Super 
Profit Tax and its replacement the Mineral Resource Rent Tax. Both of these taxation 
schemes, the controversy therein, and their relationship to resource curse factors are 
discussed in a future section. Both taxation schemes are attempts by the Australian 
federal government to gain access to increased rents from mining, and regardless of their 
desired economic end states, both represent negative factors of the resource curse in their 
failures and the uncertainty and government infighting they caused.  
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 Economic Management 2.
How have long-term governmental policy decisions impacted the mining sector 
and the overall economy?  
Australia seems to be managing its macroeconomic policy well—having recorded 
its 21st consecutive recession-free year in 2013.81  Australia has historically had an open 
economy that displayed a large dependence on primary exports. At federation in 1901, 
exports accounted for around 25 percent of GDP, and experienced their highest boom by 
supplying the U.S. in the 1950s Korean War. As the graph below displays, exports have 
remained an important part of Australia’s economy, and today account for over 20 
percent of GDP. (See Figures 3 and 4). 
 
Figure 3.  Australia Exports/Imports percent of GDP 1900–2000 
                                                 
81 Norman, Australia: Economy, 5. 
 32 
 
Figure 4.  Australia Exports percent GDP 2000–201282 
Mining has recently undergone a large boom period tied to the growth of China, 
and is currently Australia’s second largest contributor industry to GDP.83  At the start of 
the boom in the early 2000’s, private investment in mining was actually a greater 
contributor to GDP than the exports it supported. Those investments have since paid off, 
and capacity has increased so that exports now make up the bulk contribution to GDP.84  
Despite the robustness of the mining sector, or perhaps because of it, other sectors of the 
economy have not fared so well. The strength of the Australian dollar coupled with 
strong demand for commodities did bring record mining profits and rents, yet some 
blame the mining sector for driving prices too high and squeezing out other sectors of the 
economy. Due to this phenomenon—commonly known as Dutch disease, which will be 
discussed in a later section—the end result was corporate failings in airlines, automobiles, 
telecommunications, and insurance. Some claim these failures to be normal structural 
dynamics of a modern economy, yet others see the resource curse calling. 
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Further cause for concern for some was the development of an apparent 
dependency on foreign markets as the nation’s current account deficit on the balance of 
payments more than doubled from 2001 to 2013. This deficit in the current account was 
most likely the result of normal free trade practices of a developed economy. As Figure 5 
below explains, the deficit did come down somewhat after 2008 before rising again, 
demonstrating that Australia’s strong export growth and strengthening currency after the 
global financial crisis did play a factor. 
   
Figure 5.  Australia Current Account Deficit 2005–201285 
Unfortunately, and possibly because of the deficit, mistakes were made with 
monetary policy—namely seven separate interest rate increases of 2009 and 2010 that 
were miscalculated and immediately reversed. After 2007, confused investors watched 
the Australian official cash rate drop from 7.5 percent to 3.0 percent then rise back to 7.0 
percent, only to drop again back to 3.0 percent.86  The decisions to raise rates in the 
middle of a recovery were premature and hurt consumer confidence in Australia’s 
economic governance.  
As ill-fated as these decisions made by the reserve bank were, it must not be 
forgotten that they were made in the context of a minerals boom, a global financial crisis, 
and a crisis in government. Had the crises not occurred, the mining boom would have 
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played an even larger effect as the central bank likely would have been compelled to 
make higher rate increases to try to stave off inflation, which is its number one goal.  
 Resource Rents 3.
Barma et al. describe a “rent-capture regime” as the institutional model of 
ownership, contracts, and fiscal regimes under which decisions pertaining to natural 
resources exploration, extraction, and taxation pertain.87Australia has a long history of 
free access to markets and strong property rights; the mining sector is no exception. Rents 
from resource exports are garnished through state royalties and commonwealth 
government taxes. Each state has special mining provisions for the royalties mining 
companies must pay. As there are far too many legislative rules per state to discuss here, 
a few will be highlighted in order to build an overall picture of Australia’s resource rent-
capture regime. 
The resource rent-capture regime incorporates corporate use of public resources 
for private gain, and looks at how much of that gain goes back to society through taxes 
and royalties. Rent is what falls between that which consumers are willing to pay (price) 
and that which firms can supply (costs). Part of this rent is returned to the firm as profit. 
Profit can be further defined in commodity markets as normal and excessive, or super 
profit.88  Super profit is the return to the firm from extraordinary price jumps in the 
commodity they sell. Given a set taxation or royalty scheme, because of this price boom, 
the relatively few firms inherent to mining can gain very high profits with relatively little 
given back to society because the royalties were set before the boom. Super profit, then, 
is the difference in price between what the market demand would normally set and what 
the booming demand sets. This is important for Australia in that the Labor party has 
repeatedly attempted to levy new taxes upon this super profit, as discussed above in 
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section B.1. Further analysis of both laws and how they differed in their approach to 
resource curse mitigation follows the next section detailing tax schemes.  
A historical state-centered approach of different resource extraction regimes helps 
to explain how the proposals for MRRT and RSPT came about, by emphasizing that 
Australia’s mining boom has been a relatively recent phenomenon. For instance, 
Australians were unaware that significant mineral deposits existed in their country until 
the geological surveys of the 1980s revealed just how vast the mining potential was.89 
After gold was discovered in New South Wales in 1823, Australia experienced its first 
mining boom and has had a robust mining industry ever since. The resource boom of the 
1960s fueled the contemporary mining environment. Prior to 1960, the general consensus 
was that Australia lacked the resource base of iron ore for domestic consumption let 
alone export.90  Huge discoveries in Western Australia changed all that, and Australia 
now is the largest exporter of iron ore in the world.  
Mining operations in Australia form a complex legislative web in terms of 
jurisdiction. Private property owners do not have a claim to what is under their property, 
and only enjoy limited rights to surface minerals, exploration, and mining operations. 
Mining operations are usually carried out then via state-corporation agreements on public 
lands. The states own all the resources within their borders and each has its own royalty 
scheme therein; the commonwealth government owns the resources of the surrounding 
territorial waters and economic exclusion zones, plus legislates and enforces laws for the 
collection of corporate income taxes for mining operations.91 As a consequence of this 
mineral jurisdiction, each state legislates and enforces a different rent-capture regime, 
overviews of which are discussed below.  
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The largest mineral producing states are Western Australia, Queensland, and the 
Northern Territory, and their rental capture regimes differ significantly. Western 
Australia uses a system of specific and ad valorem royalties; Queensland uses a 
progressive, hybrid royalty system that applies different rents based on the prices of 
minerals extracted; and the Northern Territory uses an accounting profit based system.92 
Western Australia (WA) has two general royalty systems. The 1978 Mining Act 
and the related 1981 Mining Regulations specify that low-value, bulk, non-metallic 
minerals have a specific royalty of A$.62 per ton (construction use)/ A$1.00 per ton 
(metallurgy use) with an annual adjusted rate for coal.93  Higher value, metallic minerals 
use an ad valorem royalty system that is tiered in order to attract refining operations to 
the state. For example, bulk minerals are taxed at 7.5 percent whereas refined metals are 
taxed only 2.5 percent.94  Included in the mining regulations are specific fees per metal. 
For instance, gold is charged 2.5 percent of spot market price at time of sale, whereas 
fine-scale iron ores are charged 5.625 percent.95  The most economically important 
minerals have specific legislated regulations that can only be changed if both the 
government and corporation agree. Problems with the current system include lag time 
and perceived excessive profit taking. Lag time speaks to the adjustment necessary in 
legislature due to mineral price changes. The current system allows for the rebase royalty 
rates from problems due to market shocks or recapitalization must be negotiated and then 
legislated, which can be a lengthily process. If on the other hand the commodity booms, 
then the state gets some higher revenue due to higher prices, but the corporation gets 
significantly higher profits from the remaining revenue. There have been many proposals 
to tax this “super profit” and the Gillard government passed legislation to do so, but the 
new Abbott government has since rescinded it. 
Queensland enacted legislation in 2003 for specific mineral royalties of A$.50 – 
A$1.80 per ton depending on the type of mineral, and ad valorem for some minerals such 
                                                 
92 Guj, Mineral Royalties and Other Mining-Specific Taxes, 3. 
93 Ibid., 5. 
94 Ibid., 5. 
95 Ibid., 5. 
 37 
as gemstones, plus an adjustable ad valorem rate that takes account for market conditions 
for more economically important minerals.96  Queensland also includes more flexible 
price-adjusted royalties and concessions to mining corporations, such as lower royalty 
fees for smaller corporations and processed minerals (metals) plus various deductions for 
marine transport and insurance. Queensland’s scheme is dominated by coal, which gives 
the other mineral royalties somewhat more flexibility than other states as they have less a 
presence.97   
The Northern Territory has the least amount of mineral resource extraction from 
the three examples. Total 2013 Northern Territory mineral production was just over A$30 
billion, versus A$100 billion and A$120 billion for Western Australia and Queensland, 
respectively.98  Possibly due to the small mining presence in Northern Territory, it uses a 
more economically efficient accounting-based system to levy royalties. A complex 
formula is used to find a net value of specific mining operations, and then a flat tax of 18 
percent is applied to this value. The idea is that small mines or less successful mines will 
not be punished with higher across-the-board rates, thus incentivizing new start-ups and 
activity. The down side of such a system is the complex charging of rates, namely that 
each royalty is levied on a case-by-case basis, which requires a large admin staff and 
increased cost to the state. 
Australians have debated the merits and fairness of the above rent-capture 
regimes for many years. At the heart of the debate is the perception that mining 
companies’ win out from high commodity prices generating huge profits. Many of these 
profits go to foreign shores as well because, due to the nature of mineral extraction, many 
of the firms are large multinational corporations. Furthermore, state royalty collections do 
not rise proportionally because they operate under traditional specific or ad valorem 
collection schemes. Therefore, the community and government miss out on their fair 
share of what should be a national public resource. Such perceptions can drive emotional 
short-term thinking that instigates reactionary un-business-friendly policy—such as the 
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controversial RSPT and MRRT. These unpopular taxes factored into the removal of two 
Prime Ministers, impaired governance, and created uncertainty. In so doing they 
represent negative outcomes of the resource curse.  
 The RSPT and MRRT  4.
The Resource Super Profit Tax and the subsequent Mineral Resource Rent Tax 
both represent efforts taken by the Australian federal government to access new rents 
from mining. This rent seeking behavior is not necessarily a bad thing, as Australia’s 
government is not lacking in institutional strength, transparency, and rule of law. For 
instance, Australia has historically ranked in the top ten countries for governance by 
transparency international in their Corruption Perception Index. Regardless of Australia’s 
institutional quality and transparency, the failed RSPT and MRRT represent negative 
outcomes of the resource curse by the governance problems they caused. Below is a brief 
summary of both. 
The RSPT was introduced in 2010 as a 40 percent tax on mining corporations 
with revenues in excess of 75 million dollars. The Rudd government did not see the 
RSPT as a roadblock against mining investment. They argued that less competitive, 
smaller mines could invest more due to them not making super-profits, plus overall 
business would benefit, as the revenue gained from RSPT would fund an overall 
corporate tax cut, fostering growth.99  The government also saw the RSPT as a more fair 
taxation scheme that allowed all Australians to benefit from mining, not just the large 
mining corporations. From a resource curse perspective, there is some validity to 
distributing resource rents so that more of the population benefits. The Australian mining 
taxation scheme was outdated. For instance, federal taxes paid by mining corporations 
were a flat rate, and effectively dropped from 33 cents per dollar in 2000 to just 14 cents 
per dollar in 2010 due to taxes not changing to the context of the boom.100  Economically 
speaking improving the tax scheme would have benefited other sectors against crowding 
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out from the mining sector. Dutch disease effects may have lessened as well from a lower 
corporate tax, making Australian goods more competitive. However, the government 
underestimated the effect a 40 percent tax would have on new investment projects by 
large mining corporations, like those that were driving the mining boom.  
The mineral council of Australia and large mining corporations believed the new 
tax would not only hurt investment, but cost jobs and hamper economic growth.101 
Spurred by numerous corporations announcing that they were cutting investment plans 
and outlooks due to the RSPT, opposition to the tax grew steadfast. Soon the anti-RSPT 
coalition included not only big mining and the Liberal opposition party, but the Business 
Council of Australia, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the 
Premiers of both Western Australia and Queensland. This coalition brought about the 
demise of RSPT and Kevin Rudd. Even though Julia Gillard was able to pass a watered 
down version of the RSPT as the MRRT, it was short lived. From a resource curse 
perspective, the RSPT was a poorly instigated attempt to gain access to more resource 
rents, even though it may have benefited more Australians through redistribution and 
lower corporate taxes, it failed to properly consult and work with the large mining 
corporations that were driving the mining boom. The MRRT that followed was a better 
compromise with big mining, but politics appeared to have derailed that as well because 
the Liberal party was able to get elected on promises to rescind it, which it did in 2013. 
The MRRT was also victim to global economics, as slowing demand in China effectively 
ended the mining boom and the MRRT actually brought in very little revenues for the 
state. Overall governance was hurt by both taxation schemes, as the influential political 
commentator Paul Kelly wrote, the “decline of Australian public policy” came about 
because “the first mining tax was far too antagonistic to the industry . . . the second is far 
too ineffectual.”102 
It is safe to argue that the RSPT and MRRT hurt the Australian economy. 
Certainly it hurt the government and party in power at its creation. The uncertainty it 
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created undermined economic growth because it damaged consumer confidence in 
governmental management of the economy. The Reserve Bank of Australia also made 
several adverse assessments around the same time RSPT and MRRT came into effect.103 
As both RSPT and MRRT were directly related to resource rents, it is apparent that this 
negative outcome came about due to strong performance in the mining sector prompting 
reactionary knee-jerk policy in an attempt to garnish further rents. The context of the 
Global Financial Crisis must be taken into account, for obvious reasons. Yet scholars 
have argued that, from 2008 to 2013, “many of the issues that the Australian economy 
confronted were of a domestic origin and were not caused by the global financial 
crisis.”104  
The challenge for Australia policy makers will be to come up with a fair and 
balanced resource rent taxation scheme that takes into account commodity prices, mining 
corporation costs, and political pressures to public perception of mining profits. Perhaps a 
modified model of Northern Territories accounting-based system should be adopted 
utilizing automation for as much of the process as possible in order to aid in transparency 
and fairness. Like a stock market, a mining resource rent market could be established 
wherein any citizen could look and see what revenues natural resource extraction is 
bringing to his or her state and how those funds are being used in the budget process. 
Being able to see what specific benefit mining brings to the state allows for greater 
transparency, citizen knowledge, and interaction. This transparency would make the state 
and the mining business accountable to the citizens of Australia and empower the citizens 
to know how their resources are being used. Proper modeling of resource-based decision 
forecasts is also essential to setting the right royalty targets to sustain business and 
support government. Unfortunately the result will only be as good as the model used, and 
modeling is “an administrative area fraught with great complexity, uncertainty, lack of 
transparency and which may be open to abuse.”105  
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C. ATTEMPTS TO MITIGATE THE RESOURCE CURSE  
 Australia Reserve Bank and Currency Derivative Markets 1.
The reserve bank of Australia operates in a similar function to other central banks 
of OECD countries. The main goal of monetary policy is to keep inflation in check, 
which has been somewhat high in Australia due to commodity booms. It is plausible to 
argue that poor planning and policy around these booms caused higher inflation. Periods 
of high inflation following commodity booms therefore signify the resource curse 
dependent variable of undesirable economic outcomes. Figure 6 below displays inflation 
(CPI) and interest rates over time. One possible explanation is that the mining boom of 
the late 1990s caused inflation (CPI) to rise, and that the Australia Reserve Bank 
responded by lowering interest rates to keep inflation in check. 
 
Figure 6.  Australia Inflation (CPI) and Interest Rates106 
Every economy experiences downturns and recessions, but there are some 
financial tools developed countries enjoy that help stave off crisis. Australia has many 
tools beyond monetary and fiscal policy that help avoid crisis. A good example is the 
development of strong currency market tools, such as the ability to finance debt in the 
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face of falling currency levels via access to foreign debt markets. Australians have been 
able to do this because they have a well-established currency derivative market.  
Access to foreign currency markets allows Australians to finance capital that their 
domestic economy would not otherwise be able to support. This is one of the advantages 
of global markets, as smaller countries can enjoy higher access to capital, money, and 
thus growth than if they were isolated. Access to global markets is just the first stepping-
stone. Any country wishing to use foreign markets to generate capital flows must also 
have credibility on said markets to do so. Foreign markets have to trust that their loans 
will be repaid, and being a stable country with a stable currency goes a long way towards 
opening doors to foreign financing.107 An example of Australia using foreign markets to 
finance their way out of a downturn can be seen from the late 1990s Asian-Russian crisis. 
Australia was faced with a significant slowdown, which meant that overall 
national income might fall and even a recession might occur. Australia was able to 
finance their way out of the drop by increasing foreign borrowing.108  This increase in 
foreign borrowing doubled the current account deficit from 3 to 6 percent in 1997–1998, 
and kept the economy growing strongly by financing capital for projects at home that 
drove household income higher. So is the solution to market shocks just to borrow your 
way out of them?  As explained above, and situation dependent of course, foreign 
borrowing did keep Australia on the “right track” because foreign markets were confident 
in the past history and stability of the Australian people, economy, and currency.  
Another method Australia has to minimize risk in foreign debt markets is their 
highly developed currency derivative market. The Australian currency derivative market 
is what banks use to intermediate capital inflows from foreign loans.109  Australian banks 
minimize their customers’ exposure to exchange rate risks through derivatives. 
Essentially Australia has relied on foreign market hedging if their currency falls. That is 
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why, even by developed standards, Australia has one of the largest derivative markets in 
the world.110 
 Attempts to Fight Dutch Disease 2.
Perhaps the largest remaining concern of possible adverse effects from Australia’s 
mining boom seems to be Dutch disease. The Netherlands experienced a natural gas 
boom in the 1960s that drove up the real exchange rate, which squeezed, and 
unfortunately resulted in the deindustrialization of other sectors (particularly 
manufacturing).111 The stronger Dutch currency made some sectors unable to compete 
and many firms went under. As mentioned earlier, there is a fear that the same process is 
underway in Australia, and there have already been failures in airlines, automobiles, 
shipbuilding, telecommunications, and insurance. Unfortunately, the problem is likely to 
get worse. During the boom’s investment phase manufacturing-related jobs were 
supported by rising incomes and expenditures that helped to offset the rising real 
exchange rate. Now that the production phase has begun, the demand for manufacturing 
and other mining-related sectors will drop off because the investment phase has dropped 
off. Unfortunately real exchange rates are still relatively high, and prices are higher still. 
A recent Reserve Bank of Australia study estimated that by 2016, manufacturing output 
will be 13 percent lower, and this is “an effect that will increase over time.”112  The 
good news is, ironically, that China’s demand is slowing. This is good news for non-
mining related sectors of the Australian economy as the real exchange rate will most 
likely drop as well and their products will become more competitive on global markets. 
 Lessons Learned from Resource Curse Factors 3.
As explained above, Australia has adopted policies to protect other sectors against 
the resource curse through exchange rate mechanisms, access to foreign capital, and 
transparent rental royalty schemes. In addition, the state has pursued high minimum 
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wages, and invested in education, health, and welfare programs to support the 
socioeconomic base. However, the crowding out of non-mining sectors has occurred 
nonetheless, such as the recent demise of the Australian automotive industry among 
others. Non-mining sectors have suffered while at the same time the strong Australian 
dollar, driven by mineral exports, has driven up prices in domestic markets such as real 
estate. As the Sydney Herald has printed, “the mining sector has crowded out almost all 
other sectors of the economy and also funneled credit and liquidity into a housing bubble 
in the real estate sector.”113  Further hampering growth is that mining is capital-intensive 
with relatively few jobs, thus disproportionate income distribution is possible and 
inequality may result. The leftist party in Australia, the Greens, wants to nationalize the 
mining industry because of inequality and many other disproportionate issues. The 
Greens claim that mining profits have rising 540 percent, yet the taxes and royalties have 
decreased.114  Such prerogatives may serve political motives to sensationalize mining in 
order to pursue a leftist agenda, but there is some validity. According to Australia’s 
Bureau of Statistics, inequality (GINI Coefficient) did rise from .305 in 2006 to .338 in 
2008, but it has since dropped back down. Perhaps inequality is not as bad as the Greens 
claim. 
Another area for further study is the issue of foreign corporate ownership in the 
mineral sector. As explained above, the investment side of the mining boom appears 
finished, and sites are moving on to ramping up production. Given the current nature of 
globalization and Australia’s embracement of free trade, it is difficult to gauge foreign 
ownership in the mining sector. One 2011 survey found that almost 80 percent of the 
mining sector belonged to foreign or multinational corporations.115  Accounting for how 
much of the profits from future production will stay in Australia vs. those that may go 
overseas will add insight into future contributions to Australia’s GDP, GDP growth, and 
income. If most mining production profits go overseas then there will be less domestic 
gain from future mining operations. However, any model must also take into 
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consideration whatever mining operations that Australian corporations own abroad, and 
what rents will come back from them. Hopefully the ownership imbalance will not be 
very severe. 
Future considerations for Australia’s economy must also include analysis of 
China’s economy, which is slowing down. Some reports say that the China-induced 
resource boom is finished, and that Australia must restructure its economy in order to 
stave off a recession.116  The Reserve Bank of Australia has noted that key commodity 
prices have fallen as well, which could hurt overall growth.117  The Reserve Bank of 
Australia is keeping track of these and multitudes of other measures, so the Australian 
economy appears in capable hands. Yet, the recent political turmoil combined with some 
of the disparities from the mining boom explained above could turn growth into 
recession. 
As the resource curse is not a linear animal—it can strike any time poor policy 
coincides with a resources boom—time will tell if Australia keeps their recession-free 
record or not. 
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FORECASTS FOR AUSTRALIA  
It may turn out to be unfortunate timing for Australia that China’s demand, and 
with it the spike in global demand for commodities such as iron ore products, has recently 
cooled off. The mining industry in Australia has just come through a decade-long 
expansionary investment period, and now that they have shifted to a production phase 
companies have to deal with global demand that will be less robust than previously 
expected. The result will be lower profit, which most likely will have follow-on effects 
for the overall Australian economy through less fiscal revenue, less wage growth, less 
jobs, and less overall growth. 
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Australia is not in any immediate danger of falling off an economic cliff. True, 
public debt is about triple that of before the financial crisis due to recent large deficit 
spending.118  The deficit for 2013 amounted to 48.5 billion AUD, or about 3 percent of 
GDP—about the same as the annual deficits of 2008–2012.119  Australia’s total public 
gross debt is approximately 30 percent of GDP, which is much lower than many other 
developed countries (Japan 220 percent, USA 106 percent, UK 104 percent, Italy 140 
percent, OECD average for 2012 was 109 percent).120  So in terms of public debt and 
fiscal deficit Australia is well positioned, just not as well positioned as before the 
financial crisis when strong mineral demand brought habitual fiscal surpluses and 
booming mining profits. Yet there are some structural issues that could translate into 
future debt problems. Australia’s government needs to change the mindset developed 
under the mining boom and recognize that future fiscal revenue cannot rely on the large 
incomes generated from the mining boom, such as increased revenues from resource 
rents, mining investment, and mining-related infrastructure. Another structural problem 
for the overall economy will be the impact of the transition from mining investment to 
mining production amidst a period of lower demand for mining products. This section 
offers analysis of forecasts and concerns of what challenges Australia may face for the 
future.   
Australia continues to struggle with one of the key explanatory factors of the 
resource curse:  institutional instability and infighting over access to resource rents, or 
lack thereof. Voting in a new party has not seemed to helped matters, with PM Tony 
Abbott’s Liberal Party losing significant points in the polls following the release of a very 
unpopular 2013 budget.121  This budget included a 2 percent tax increase and cuts to 
education and health care, but still increased the deficit and failed to make structural 
changes to promote new avenues for growth. No mention was made of exactly how best 
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to manage the rents from the mining sector. The governance problem has had a trickle-
down effect upon Australian businesses. The head of Australia’s Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Kate Carnell, voiced concern about the government’s negative impact upon 
business confidence, saying, “the future of Australia right now is pretty flat, it is a real 
issue. The government doesn’t seem to be able to prosecute the direction that it said it 
wanted to go down. What business wants? It wants a vision.”122 
Unfortunately the current vision seems to be austerity and tax increases. 
Australians already pay a lot in taxes (around 45 percent), and increasing the tax rate in 
an attempt to shrink the deficit would most likely hurt growth. Figure seven displays a 
visual clue as to how Australia’s tax scheme and government spending have increased 
over the past decade. This increased spending could be associated with the resource curse 
because the government became somewhat used to increased revenues under resource 
rents and therefore increased social programs and government spending. The fiscal 
budget always changes slower than the market and when the resource rent revenue 
shrank, the government was stuck with the boom-era spending levels. The loss of fiscal 
revenue from mining created a discrepancy between government revenue and spending, 
and resulted in pressures to curb spending to match the new lower revenue.  
                                                 
122 Innis, Michelle, “Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott survives challenge to leadership,” The 




Figure 7.  Australia Tax Revenue vs. Expenditure123 
The recent issues that Australia has experienced with the removal of prime 
ministers and the failure to come to a consensus on a mining tax represent a failing of the 
institutional process of government, which is a product of the resource curse. Australia’s 
last decade of growth can largely be tied to a robust—almost skyrocketing—period of 
growth in the mining industry. As we have seen, the mineral rents percentage of GDP 
rapidly increased from 2001 to 2011 (Figure 2, pg. 25). Keep in mind that this last decade 
was the investment phase of the mining boom, which means that had the commodities 
demand not fallen off we would have seen the mineral rents percentage of GDP increase 
even more. All of this points to an expansionary period of growth that was directly tied to 
mining. Three factors came about from the last decade that merit attention. 
1) Fiscal issues—In the last decade rents from mining brought fiscal windfalls for 
the state. Now Australia is struggling with budget woes and how to deal with a period of 
slower growth amidst pressures to decrease the deficit. 2) Structural issues - The mining 
investment phase channeled economic activity into sectors related to mining, such as 
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construction, metallurgy, mining research and development, transport, and infrastructure. 
Those same sectors are struggling along with the mining sector on how to change 
structure to suit the production phase, which requires less capital and jobs. The global 
commodity market drop-off in demand further complicates matters. 3) Dutch disease - 
Many Australian firms have relocated and some industry sectors ceased to be competitive 
because of exchange rate pressures. The automotive industry is not the only casualty; 
manufacturing percentage of GDP has shrunk from 15 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 
2013.124 The manufacturing sector itself has shrunk from 20 percent in 1980 to less than 
10 percent of the workforce in 2013.125   
Australia’s economy is in transition away from the mining boom and into the next 
cycle. This does not mean that mining will cease to be important; natural resources will 
continue to bring revenue to state and commonwealth coffers, just not as much as before. 
Economic pivot to Asia  
As Australia moves on from the mining boom, there will be a period of declining 
terms of trade, which will most likely drive substantial real depreciation. Many 
economists predict that short-term growth will slow to stagnant levels, and that real 
income for Australians will also stagnate or fall (Garnaut 2011, Gregory and Sheehan 
2013).126  The long-term solution to growth is to diversify the economy into new growth 
areas in services and innovative entrepreneurship.127  Australia will have to develop 
policies to deal with continuation effects from Dutch disease and institutional problems 
with governance, as discussed in the body of this thesis. 
While governmental structural changes can foster better growth by leading the 
way towards balanced diversification, it is the private sector that must bear the brunt of 
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the changes required in productivity of the services sector.128  Increasing productivity 
and molding a model specific to Asia’s needs will help to make up for the lost income 
from decreasing export prices. If private sector efficiencies can be increased, then 
Australia will become more competitive and this should help drive new areas of growth.  
If Australia can model its service sector to fit a complementary need in the 
production side of her Asian partners, then Australia will have developed a nice 
sustainable method to replace the lost revenue from the mining boom. 
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This work has explored resource curse factors in the political economy of 
Australia versus that of Chile. Examining the path dependence of institutional 
development, growth, and policy has identified not only how each country attempts to 
avoid the resource curse but also how each may still be privy to negative factors of the 
resource curse. Be it Dutch disease in Australia or fiscal dependence on copper in Chile, 
how a country manages its natural resources will always establish whether they become a 
blessing or a curse. 
The main goal of this work is to expose that the management of natural resources 
can and does present real consequences to the economic and political situation of any 
state. Developed or not, the mismanagement of natural resources will have dire 
consequences both politically and economically. By shifting the traditional resource curse 
lens from less-developed, oil-dependent states to more-developed mineral-rich states such 
as Australia and Chile, one can decipher the evolution of each country’s political 
economy and expunge methods other states may refer to when it comes to managing their 
natural resources. As we have seen, the major resource curse mechanisms differ 
significantly between Australia and Chile, even though their economies can be 
characterized as relatively similar in other respects—they are both small Pacific-oriented 
countries with dominant mineral export sectors.  
Chile has been extracting and selling copper on global markets longer than 
Australia has, and has experienced a much more tumultuous economic growth trajectory 
than Australia. Chile’s path towards mineral governance has centered around the question 
of political infighting for control of the resource rents; particularly the nationalization of 
Chile’s mines and the subsequent military control over the revenue hampered Chile 
through misappropriation of funds, crony capitalism, and opaqueness of resource rents. It 
was not until democracy returned to Chile that some mining interests were re-privatized, 
even though the largest mining entity by far was and remains the state-owned 
CODELCO. CODELCO continues to bring revenue to the state, but the state has taken 
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numerous reform measures to increase transparency and redirect copper revenues towards 
more sustainable economic tools and public goods.  
From a governance standpoint, Chile had to undergo some painful periods in 
order to foster the change required to build tools that help stabilize the economy. For 
instance, the massive recessions of 1999 and 2009 prompted Chile to turn to the World 
Bank for aid, which enabled new recommendations and policies that built the foundation 
for the mining-related laws Chile has today. The evolution of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy and the creation of the copper funds helped Chile to better weather global financial 
crises and have the state a savings account from which to support their currency and 
promote investment. Chile’s government also underwent numerous reforms in the past 
three decades, enabling better transparency for mining and rescinding the military-backed 
copper law. Chile’s biggest struggle ahead is how to promote new areas of growth amidst 
a period of lower than expected copper revenues. 
Australia has followed a different path in its mineral development, one that 
probably more closely resembles the Netherlands after its discovery of natural gas fields 
in the 1970s. Australia experienced a mining boom following the 1980s discovery of vast 
deposits of coal, iron ore, and other ferrous metals in the outback. Australia, unlike Chile, 
had already diversified its economy and modernized by this point. The added mining 
revenue of the late 1990s until the present was therefore somewhat unexpected and 
unplanned for. The result has been unprecedented growth in Australia’s mining sector; 
somewhat to the detriment of other sectors not related to mining. That Australia has 
undergone Dutch disease may be a point of contention, but clearly the mining-backed 
rising Australian dollar hurt exports in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. In 
addition, high mining wages probably prompted the government to set a high minimum 
wage, which made Australian labor uncompetitive globally—hence, the disappearance of 
certain sectors, such as the automotive and shipbuilding industries. Australia also has the 
benefit of numerous economic tools available to manage a downturn, such as financial 
derivatives and robust monetary policy.  
To date, Australia does not need an innovation such as counter cyclical fiscal 
policy or mining funds (although this, too, is debatable). The single largest negative 
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component of the resource curse related to Australia is that of governance. The question 
of how to appropriately distribute mining rents caused much turmoil, and the proposed 
RSPT and MRRT served to only demonstrate how divided the government was and is on 
how to solve the problem of mining taxation and redistribution. Australians are fed up 
with the “buffoonery” in their government, and no real consensus has been reached on 
how to manage mining. The opportunity may have come and gone, however, as the 
mining boom appears to be waning amid lower commodity prices and the change from 
investment to production. Mining will continue to play an important role for Australia 
however, and a way forward should be carefully considered. Perhaps the recent 
governance issues have created a turning point where Australia’s political elite 
recognizes that political strife is too costly, and a consensus may be reached.  
The implications of the research presented in this thesis are that similar states may 
evolve very different methods in dealing with their mining sectors. From a historical 
institutionalist perspective, both Australia and Chile have experienced critical junctures 
in their mining governance that brought them to where they are today. For Chile, it was 
the 1980s Latin America debt crisis that helped to unseat Pinochet and brought back 
privatization in the mining sector. The subsequent recessions of the late 1990s and late 
2000’s also enabled new legislation to better manage the economy through copper funds 
and counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Australia has experienced a critical juncture through 
the governance issue of how to properly manage taxation from mining. Two, and 
possibly three, prime ministers will have lost their seats because of failing to solve the 
fiscal issues related to mining. These events imply that negative resource curse outcomes 
emerge from political instability, failure to anticipate commodity downturns, failure to 
redistribute resource rents correctly, and failure of institutions to promote and enforce 
mining transparency and accountability.  
Times of crisis require economic and most importantly political stability. The 
government in power must have a vision and a plan to take the country out of the crisis, 
and prudent planning should also help anticipate rainy days. Chile has institutionalized 
fiscal planning based on the forecasting of copper prices. Other natural-resource 
dependent countries may adopt a similar system of planning to their situation. Australia 
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has benefited by economic diversification, and even though it did not have a mining fund 
or tax before the global financial crisis, the strength of the banking system, monetary 
policy, and access to a large financial derivatives market helped keep the economy out of 
recession.  
In order to avoid the resource curse, other avenues of revenue must be made 
available and the rents from the resource extraction must be fairly distributed. Even 
though Australia is a developed economy and has grown well for over twenty years, the 
disagreement with just how to manage resource rents and taxes therefrom caused the 
downfall of both the Rudd and Gillard governments and arguably hurt the country 
economically as well. Chile is also currently struggling with how to meet public demand 
for better education and health and the relationship this demand has to mining revenue. 
Chile’s government will have to carefully weigh decisions in the weaker commodity 
revenue period ahead, while still bringing better opportunities to Chileans. 
Institutions really do matter. As Chile’s transition from dictatorship to democracy 
signifies, there was a lot of uncertainty and opaqueness with just how institutions were 
set up and how they used rents from copper. The military dictatorship established for 
itself a long-lasting source of security and revenue through appropriating part of the 
copper rents. While this move helped the military, it most likely hurt the state by 
hampering transition to free and functioning democracy and taking away funds that could 
have been better used to promote economic growth through things like education, 
welfare, health, or infrastructure. Australia’s institutions also play a huge role in mining. 
The mining boom in Australia demonstrates that institutions are slow and hard to change, 
in that the question still remains after years of debate into how to manage resource rents.   
An avenue for further research could be how Chile’s and Australia’s support for 
free trade has impacted their propensity to experience different elements of the resource 
curse. Specifically, researchers could explore tariffs and treaty agreements surrounding 
Chilean and Australian mining exports to see if there is a correlation or causation 
between governmental trade agreements and resource rents. Perhaps governments that 
receive higher rents from a dominant commodity, such as copper or iron, have a 
motivation to keep tariffs in place on said commodity in order to gain higher rents.   
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Either way, copper in Chile and iron ore in Australia will continue to play 
important roles in the economies of both countries. Thus, the politicians of both countries 
will continue to legislate for how those commodities are controlled—hopefully, to the 
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